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HAS EXPANSION OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT GONE TOO FAR?:
ENFORCING ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN VOID
AB INITIO CONTRACTS
"The Supreme Court has only itself to blame for the confusion and
contradictory holdings that have followed its FAA rulings of the last
forty years."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a means to privately resolve disputes in which a
neutral third party is authorized to review the disputed claim and render
a binding decision. The American Arbitration Association (AAA)
defines arbitration as a:
[S]ubmission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a
final and binding decision. The arbitrators may be attorneys or
business persons with expertise in a particular field. The parties
control the range of issues to be resolved by arbitration, the
scope of the relief to be awarded, and many of the procedural
aspects of the process. Arbitration is less formal than a court
trial. The hearing is private. Few awards are reviewed by the
courts because the parties have agreed to be bound by the
decision of the arbitrator.3
The recent proliferation of arbitration in the United States is
unprecedented.4  It is nearly impossible to conduct day-to-day
operations without consenting to a binding agreement to arbitrate one's
1. Nancy R. Kornegay, Prima Paint to First Options: The Supreme Court's Procrustean
Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act and Fraud, 38 HOuS. L. REV. 335, 358 (2001).
2. See, e.g., David P. Pierce, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of its
Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
3. American Arbitration Association (AAA) website, A Beginner's Guide to Alternative
Dispute Resolution, at http://www.adr.org.
4. There were an astounding 198,491 cases filed with the AAA in 2000, representing a
41% year-to-year increase from 1999. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2001), available at
http://www.adr.org.
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claims.' Employment contracts6 and credit card agreements7 are two of
many situations in which arbitration has become common.
Given businesses' perceived advantages of arbitration, this
proliferation "should not be surprising."8 Arbitration, as opposed to
litigation, arguably provides the "twin benefits" of efficient resolution
and low cost.' Arbitration achieves this result by allowing parties to
forgo numerous motions as well as discovery, opting instead for an
informal process that de-emphasizes the adversarial nature of dispute
resolution and enhances the importance of the parties' working
together.'0 In a commercial arbitration, the arbitrator, in contrast to a
judge, is free to facilitate communication between the parties, and is not
bound by precedent. Rather, an arbitrator can use common sense in
reaching a conclusion."
The proliferation of arbitration in the United States is also due, in
large part, to the Supreme Court's expansion of the Federal Arbitration
Act" (FAA or Act). As will be shown, the Supreme Court's effort to
expand the FAA has led to strained reasoning and "mysterious"
5. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996) (warning readers that
"the next time that you try to file a lawsuit... you may well find the door of the
courthouse ... barred").
6. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) generally applies to employment contracts).
7. If you have not done so already, closely read the fine print of your credit card
agreement. There is a strong likelihood that you have agreed to arbitrate any claims that you
have against your credit card company.
8. Pierce, supra note 2, at 624.
9. Id. (citing N. Sue Van Sant Palmer, Lender Liability and Arbitration: Preserving the
Fabric of Relationship, 42 VAND. L. REv. 947, 963 n.104 (1989) ("Speaking for those who
have had experience and who are engaged in business, I may say this, that arbitration saves
time, saves trouble, saves money." (quoting Mr. Bernheimer, chairman of Committee on
Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of New York)). Not everyone, however, is convinced
that arbitration is the "panacea" for the ills that inhibit litigation as an effective form of
dispute resolution. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 5, at 674-97 (arguing that the Supreme
Court's policy arguments for the expansion of the FAA are illegitimate). Professor Jean R.
Sternlight, for instance, has noted that there is insufficient empirical data to support the
argument that "arbitration is necessarily faster, cheaper, and otherwise better than litigation."
Id. at 678. Sternlight has also noted that as the size and scope of the arbitration increases, so
too does the parties' dissatisfaction with the process. Id. at 678-79 (citing Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,460 (1988)).
10. Pierce, supra note 2, at 625.
11. Id.
12. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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results. 3 This expansion has erroneously led circuit courts to believe
that, through the FAA, Congress manifested a preference for
arbitration over litigation in all circumstances.14
Strained efforts at expansion have led to particularly absurd results
in one area of arbitration law. Recent circuit court cases have
misconstrued the scope of the FAA's expansion by holding that a claim
that a contract is void ab initio,"5 and therefore nonexistent, 6 is
nonetheless arbitrable due to an arbitration clause embedded in that
contract.17
The thesis of this Comment is simple: the FAA was not intended,
and should not be construed, to compel enforcement of an arbitration
agreement where the contract is void. Part II of this Comment will
begin by giving a brief history of the FAA, focusing on Congress's intent
in enacting the federal law mandating arbitration. Part III will focus on
the Supreme Court's treatment of the FAA-from the Court's early
reluctance to extend the Act beyond mutually consensual private
arrangements to the cases that are responsible for its expansion. Part IV
will subsequently narrow the focus of this Comment by reviewing the
Supreme Court's holding in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.,8 the decision that is primarily responsible for the
expansion of the FAA and also serves as a cornerstone for the
discussion of whether a court or an arbitrator should decide challenges
to contracts containing arbitration agreements. Part V will then engage
in a discussion of the distinction between void and voidable contracts,
and how expansion of the FAA has allowed courts to force arbitration
of contracts that are void ab initio and, therefore, nonexistent.
Part VI of this Comment will argue that the enforcement of
arbitration in void contracts is inherently unjust and well beyond the
scope that Congress intended for three reasons: (1) it places an
agreement to arbitrate on a higher footing than other contract
provisions, which is inconsistent with Congress's initial intent in enacting
13. Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 287-
88 (1999). See also infra Part V.
14. See Sternlight, supra, note 5, at 639.
15. Ab initio is a Latin phrase meaning "from the beginning." BLACKS'S LAW
DICTIONARY 4 (7th ed. 1999). Throughout this Comment the term "void" will be used to
refer to a contract that is void "from the beginning," and thus nonexistent.
16. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
17. See cases cited infra Part V.
18. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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the FAA and the Supreme Court's holdings that have invalidated state
laws that have put arbitration clauses on unequal footing; (2) it infringes
on states' rights to govern contract law and protect its consumers; and
(3) it places authority in an arbitrator who has no jurisdiction. Finally,
this Comment will conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court needs to
clarify its Prima Paint holding so as to extend only to cases where a valid
contract actually exists. Only by doing so will the Court alleviate some
of the confusion and contradiction surrounding arbitration law under
the FAA.
II. HISTORY OF THE FAA
A. Enactment of the FAA-Congressional Purpose
The early American judiciary demonstrated an intense hostility
toward arbitration.9  Courts, following English precedent, would
generally allow two willing parties to arbitrate their claims, but would
refuse to enforce arbitration when a party changed its mind "on the
ground that an 'agreement of the parties cannot oust [the] court of its
jurisdiction.'""
Judicial sentiment disfavoring arbitration did not change until the
early twentieth century, when big business began to boom and
businesses began lobbying for arbitration as a means to reduce the delay
and expense of litigation.2 Lobbyists initially focused on reforming
state laws, but soon realized that such laws would be futile unless federal
courts would honor them.22 As a response, reformers working with the
American Bar Association drafted the original FAA statute, adopted by
Congress in 1925.23
The enactment of the FAA was clearly an intention by Congress to
19. Pierce, supra note 2, at 625.
20. Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305,1309 (1985) (citation omitted). Although courts would
typically honor an arbitrated decision, an agreement to arbitrate was "revocable at the option
of either party prior to commencement of an arbitral proceeding.... [O]ne party to an
arbitration agreement could not use the court system to compel arbitration." Id. at 1310-11.
21. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 645.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 645-46. The FAA was originally known as the U.S. Arbitration Act, but
"increasingly came to be known as the Federal Arbitration Act." Id. at 639 n.12 (citing IAN
R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 231 N.48 (1992)). The current version of the FAA is now codified
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (2000).
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force courts to honor arbitration agreements. The legislative history of
the FAA indicates that Congress's purpose was to place private parties'
agreements to arbitrate on the "same footing" as other contracts.24
Accordingly, at the time of its enactment, there was widespread belief
that the FAA would only apply to consensual transactions and not to
arbitration agreements offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive
customers or employees. ,25
B. Relevant Provisions of the FAA
The FAA is currently codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208. The "keystone
provision, 26 of the Act is section 2:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.27
Section 2 serves as the major substantive provision, providing a
legislative answer to the judicial hostility that arbitration had received,
by instructing that, where the agreement is in writing, it is to be honored
by a court." Section 2 also provides a savings clause, whereby a party
may challenge the enforceability of the arbitration agreement just as any
24. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 626-27 (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468,
474 (1989) ("stating that congressional policy was created... to ensure that arbitration
agreements would be placed on [the] same footing as other agreements")). As will be shown,
this intention is currently being contradicted by allowing for the arbitration of contracts that
are void from their inception. See infra Part V.
25. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 407, 414 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing Federal Arbitration Act Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9-11 (1923)).
26. Pierce, supra note 2, at 627. Professor Sternlight refers to section 2 as the
"centerpiece" of the Act. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 646.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (emphasis added). Section 1 of the Act contains an exclusion
provision as follows: "[B]ut nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
28. Id. § 2.
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other contract would be challenged.29
Sections 3 and 4 are enforcement mechanisms ensuring that private,
written agreements to arbitrate are enforced by courts.3" Section 3
instructs a court, upon the application of either party to the arbitration
agreement, to stay pending litigation that is the proper subject of the
agreement to arbitrate.' Section 4 goes further by instructing any
United States district court to compel arbitration when one of the parties
has failed to allow a dispute that is subject to a written arbitration
agreement to be arbitrated.32 While these provisions are similar in that
they both provide a legislative mandate for a court to facilitate
arbitration, one important difference presents itself: whereas section 3
refers to "courts of the United States,"33 section 4 refers to "any United
States district court."3" There is no explanation in the legislative history
for this distinction.35 This unclear distinction is just one example of the
confusion that courts were left to grapple with in the practical
application of the FAA. This confusion will be explored in greater
detail below.
29. Id.
30. Id.§§3,4.
31. Section 3 reads:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
Id. § 3.
32. Section 4 reads, in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court .... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making
of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.
Id. § 4.
33. Id. § 3.
34. Id. § 4.
35. Pierce, supra note 2, at 628.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S EXPANSION OF THE FAA
A. Unanswered Questions
When the FAA was passed, unclear drafting and a sparse legislative
history left many questions unanswered. s6 These questions would
provide the Supreme Court with the maneuvering room necessary to
expand the scope of the Act well beyond Congress's intentions.
Overlying the confusion was the primary question of which of three
possible powers Congress had relied upon to pass the legislation: (1) its
power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause; (2)
its power to issue procedural edicts under Article III of the
Constitution; or (3) its power at the time37 to enact a federal rule of
substantive law for federal jurisdiction cases.38  The answer to this
question would provide the basis for just how far the FAA could be
expanded.39
Two additional questions resulted from the confusion regarding the
power upon which Congress had relied. First, it was unclear whether
the Act was to be applied in state courts as well as in federal courts.0
The power that Congress relied upon would take on particular
significance in answering this question after Erie. Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,41 which denied Congress the ability to formulate substantive
rules of federal common law based solely on its Article III powers.
36. See Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1308 (noting that "[alt the time of passage, Congress
failed to perceive the constitutional problems latent in the legislation").
37. As will be illustrated, Congress no longer had the option of relying on this power
after the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 2, at 629-30.
39. See infra Part III.C.
40. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 649 (noting that while the legislative history is
unclear, and the Supreme Court eventually decided otherwise, "virtually all those who have
studied the history of the Act in its context have concluded that the FAA was viewed at the
time as a procedural and remedial statute governing only federal courts") (citing, inter alia,
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting)). The discrepancy in wording between section 3 and section 4 certainly
suggests that at least section 4 was intended to be applicable only in federal courts.
41. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42. Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1316 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (finding unconstitutional
congressional attempts to impose on states rules that are unsupported by specific
constitutional provisions)). The Erie Court, in a personal injury case brought on diversity
grounds, stated that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.... There is no federal
2002]
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Consequently, had the Court found that Congress was relying on this
power, the FAA would have been strictly limited to application in
federal courts. Second, it was unclear whether the Act "was intended to
be a substantive or purely procedural mechanism.' 43 As will be shown,
the Supreme Court resolved both of these questions in a manner that
would extend the FAA as far as possible, creating particular confusion
in the Act's application to allegations that a contract is void, and
therefore nonexistent.
B. "The Period of Original Intent"44 and the Erie Doctrine (1925-1966)
Early decisions interpreting the scope of the FAA focused on the
importance of voluntary, knowing consent by both parties.45  The
Supreme Court's 1953 decision of Wilko v. Swan 6 represented the first
major interpretation of the scope of the FAA.47 In Wilko, the Court
prohibited arbitration of a customer's securities fraud action against a
brokerage house, noting a concern that the arbitration agreement was
not mutually consensual and did not serve the public interest.
48
Similarly, three years later, the Court further elaborated on the
importance of protecting consumers and workers from non-consensual
arbitration by finding an arbitration clause unenforceable as applied to a
discharged employee who had not knowingly agreed to arbitrate his
claims. 9
Early decisions also reflected an intention to limit the Act to
application in federal courts. From the Act's inception until 1945, no
federal court even considered applying the FAA to an action brought in
general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State." Id. at 1316 n.58 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).
43. Pierce, supra note 2, at 629.
44. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 644. Professor Sternlight provides an excellent analysis
on the history of the FAA and will be cited to extensively in this Section. Sternlight
categorizes the evolution of the FAA into three eras: (1) "The Period of Original Intent
(1925-1966)"; (2) "Seeds of Myths are Planted (1967-1982)"; and (3) "The Myths Fully
Develop (1983-present)." Id. at 644, 653, 660. This Comment will focus primarily on the
expansion of the FAA that took place after the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Prima
Paint.
45. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, the binding arbitration clauses
contained in most credit card agreements would not have survived the Court's scrutiny during
the period of "original intent."
46. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
47. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 648.
48. Id. (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438).
49. Id. (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)).
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a state court.0 The Court's decision in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus51
is illustrative of this, where the Court insinuated that the FAA was a
procedural statute that would apply exclusively in federal courts. 2
For the most part, courts had no reason to consider the applicability
of the FAA in state courts. 3 This would change with the Supreme
Court's decision in Erie that held that state substantive law rather than a
federal common law would govern cases brought pursuant to diversity
jurisdiction." Suddenly, determining which of the three possible powers
Congress intended to use when passing the FAA became significant.55
Because the development of a federal common law of arbitration was no
longer a viable option, the FAA was presumably either enacted under
the Commerce Clause or it was merely a procedural edict. 6 Labeling
the FAA as a mere procedural rule to be applied in the federal court
system would limit its application to federal courts. However, if it were
determined that Congress was using its power to regulate substantive
law under the Commerce Clause, the Act could be extended to state
courts.58
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,59 a diversity suit in
which litigation was stayed pending arbitration, the Court first began to
analyze the "ramifications of Erie for the FAA."" First, the Court
concluded that arbitration is "outcome determinative, 61 under the test
set forth in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York.62 The Court
50. Id. at 650 n.63 (citing Ian R. Macneil, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 127-28 (1992) (noting that
"[a]rbitration actions brought in state courts were governed by the state's own arbitration
laws," which were often less accepting of arbitration than the FAA)).
51. 284 U.S. 263, 279 (1932) (holding that the FAA is constitutional because Congress
has the power to implement procedural remedies with respect to maritime matters).
52. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 650 (citing Dreyfus, 284 U.S. at 277-79).
53. Id. at 650-51.
54. Id. at 651.
55. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
56. See supra Part III.A.
57. See id.
58. Id.; Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1316-18.
59. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
60. Sternlight supra note 5, at 651.
61. Id. (citing Bernhardt, 350 U.S. 198).
62. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Guaranty Trust dictated that, due to a public policy of avoiding
forum shopping, any outcome-determinative rule must be drawn from state law. 350 U.S. at
203. The Bernhardt Court determined that arbitration was outcome determinative, noting
that "[ilf the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
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determined, however, that the arbitration agreement fell outside the
substantive provisions of section 2 of the Act because the transaction
was neither maritime, nor did it involve commerce.63 This conclusion
was made despite the fact that the arbitration agreement was entered
into by a New York corporation and its employee who was to perform
the contract in Vermont.6" Such a determination allowed the Court to
avoid deciding whether Congress had indeed used its Commerce Power
to enact the FAA. The Court itself expressly noted that it construed the
FAA narrowly to avoid the constitutional issue dealing with Congress's
limited power under Erie to make arbitration enforceable in diversity
suits despite contrary state law.65 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
expressly noted the importance of interpreting the FAA "narrowly to
avoid impinging on states' rights to regulate substantive law."66
The Court was able to skirt the issue of which power Congress had
relied upon when enacting the FAA. However, by determining that the
FAA had a "substantive"67 effect, the Court seemingly preempted the
future opportunity to rule that Congress had used its power to issue a
procedural edict under Article III of the Constitution.66 Courts were
consequently left to decide whether Congress had relied upon its
commerce powers or Article III powers to provide rules for diversity
cases." If in the subsequent decision the Court chose the latter, it would
have to reconcile the previous decision to the contrary in Bernhardt, as
well as how the FAA could be imposed in an area that Erie had
expressly forbidden.0
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought." Hirschman,
supra note 20, at 1320 n.82 (quoting Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203).
63. Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1319 (citing Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200).
64. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 651 n.74 (citing Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 198) (suggesting
that under today's more lenient standards this would certainly be considered a transaction
involving interstate commerce)).
65. Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1319-20 (citing Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202). Justice
Frankfurter, in his concurrence, suggested that the FAA should not be applied to diversity
cases at all "to avoid having to decide whether it was unconstitutional for the federal
government to require a state law claim to be taken to arbitration." Sternlight, supra note 5,
at 651 n.75 (citing Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-04).
66. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 651 (citing Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-04). This concern
is now being overlooked by some courts. See infra Part V.C.; VI.A.2.
67. See Hirschman, supra note 20, at 1320 (citing Berhnardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01);
Sternlight, supra note 5, at 651 (citing Berhnardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01).
68. Hirshman, supra note 19, at 1320.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Courts could have escaped any Erie problem by construing the FAA
as enacted pursuant to Congress's commerce power.7' This solution,
however, would have led to further confusion. For instance, creating a
federal substantive right should qualify actions to enforce arbitration in
federal courts, through federal subject matter jurisdiction.72 Second,
even if the Act is not construed as warranting federal question
jurisdiction, it should take precedence in state courts under the
Supremacy Clause.73 In an effort to expand arbitration into all realms of
society, subsequent decisions would prove that the Court had little
concern for these issues.
C. Prima Paint: Expansion and Truncation of State Law
From 1925 until 1967, federal courts were reluctant to extend the
FAA in a manner that would force arbitration on parties that had not
knowingly agreed to arbitrate their claims or in a manner that would
impinge on a state's rights to govern substantive law.74
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,75 this
reluctance ended. In Prima Paint, the Court was finally forced to
determine which power Congress had relied upon in enacting the FAA.
In this federal diversity suit, the Court was unable, as it did in
Bernhardt," to read the contract so as to take it out of the aegis of
section 2 of the Act.77 Accordingly, the Court was forced to decide
whether Congress relied on its commerce powers or its Article III
powers to legislate rules of decision in cases where the parties were
diverse, a power that it had enjoyed until the Erie decision. In an effort
to avoid Erie problems, yet still expand the FAA, the Court swiftly
determined that Congress had enacted the FAA pursuant to its
78commerce powers, a contention that Justice Black, in his dissent,
71. Id. at 1317.
72. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), which dictates that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States" (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1317-18 n.67 (noting that while section 2
standing alone could possibly support federal question jurisdiction, sections 3 and 4 mandate
a congressionally-created limit on such jurisdiction).
73. Id. at 1317-18 n.67.
74. See supra Part III.B.
75. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). This Comment will engage in an extended discussion of the
majority's holding in Prima Paint in Part IV, infra.
76. 350 U.S. 198 (1956); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77. 388 U.S. at 401.
78. Id.
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vehemently disagreed with as being entirely unsupported by the
legislative history of the Act."
Classifying the FAA as a substantive law enacted under the
Commerce Clause served as a breeding ground for the Act's subsequent
expansion. Several Supreme Court cases in the 1980s continued the
expansion of the FAA, including Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.0 and Southland Corp. v. Keating." These
cases were the "logical consequence" of the Supreme Court's
interpretation in Prima Paint that the FAA is a federal substantive law
passed under Congress's commerce power."
In Moses H. Cone, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether a
federal court could, or should, compel arbitration under section 4 of the
FAA when the opposing party filed a parallel action in state court. 3
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that
the district court erred in not compelling arbitration.s4 According to the
Court:
Questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.... The
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."
79. According to Justice Black, "there are clear indications in the legislative history that
the Act was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts or to
provide an independent federal-question basis for jurisdiction in federal courts." Id. at 420
(Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Thus, the majority's view that Congress was
creating a body of federal substantive law under its commerce powers was erroneous. Id.
80. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
81. 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (reaffirming prior
decisions that the FAA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and that it had
created federal substantive law); Hirschman, supra note 20, at 1340 (citing Dean Witter
Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
82. See Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1307.
83. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 4; see also Hirshman, supra note 20, at 1306-07;
Kornegay, supra note 1 at 346 (providing a general synopsis of the case).
84. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-26; see also Hirshman, supra note 19, at 1338
(commenting that the Court defined the "scope of the FAA in very expansive terms and
twice opined that the Act governs in either state or federal court").
85. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 660 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25, and noting
that "the Court did not provide an explicit rationale for why arbitration should be favored
over litigation").
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Suddenly, it was determined that, contrary to the Court's previous
decision in Wilko v. Swan,86 the FAA had created a federal policy
favoring arbitration, "proclaiming... that ... arbitration served a
substantial public purpose and should be favored regardless of the
parties' intentions. "'
In Southland, the Court "found an opportunity to even further
truncate state contract laws.""8 The California Supreme Court held that
claims under the California Franchise Investment Law were outside
the scope of the FAA, and thus were not subject to the arbitration
agreement.0 The Supreme Court concluded that the FAA creates
binding law that, under the Supremacy Clause, state courts must
enforce. Because the California law directly conflicted with section 2, it
"violat[ed] the Supremacy Clause" and was unconstitutional." This
finding was a further consequence of the Supreme Court's holding in
Prima Paint that Congress had used its commerce powers to enact the
FAA and confirmed Justice Black's concerns that, despite clear
legislative intent to the contrary, the FAA would be forced upon states.92
The Court did not finish with the expansion of the FAA in the 1980s.
In 1996, the Court extended its scope even further.93 In Doctor's
Associates v. Cassorato,94 the Court held that a Montana requirement
that an arbitration clause be "typed in underlined capital letters on the
first page of the contract" was inconsistent with the FAA because it put
the arbitration clause on unequal footing with the other provisions in
86. 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (declining to enforce an arbitration clause that was not mutually
consensual and in the public's interest); see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
87. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 660.
88. Kornegay, supra note 1, at 349 (describing the Moses H. Cone and Southland
decisions as "[s]horten[ing] the States' [l]egs").
89. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000 (West 1977). The California Supreme Court interpreted
the statute as requiring claims to be brought in court rather than arbitrated. Sternlight, supra
note 5, at 664 (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 10).
90. Southland, 465 U.S. at 5.
91. Id. at 10 (alteration in original); see also Kornegay, supra note 1, at 349 (adding that
the Court "went on boldly, and inexplicably, to claim that in enacting Section 2 of the FAA,
'Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration."') (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 10).
92. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
93. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
94. Id.
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the contract.95  According to the Court, "[w]hat states may not do is
decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms...,
but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause."96 The Court went
on to state that "courts may not... invalidate arbitration agreements
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions."97 Whereas
Moses H. Cone and Southland made it clear that states could not require
specific claims to be resolved through litigation rather than arbitration,
Doctor's Associates further specified that any attempt by a state to
protect its citizens by singling out an arbitration clause from the rest of
the contract would be preempted by the FAA.98
D. A "Partial Restoration "9 of State Power to Govern Contract Law
Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Doctor's Associates severely limited
the states' long-time right to govern contract law, an essential area of
the law when dealing with arbitration agreements.'0 At the same time,
however, two Supreme Court cases served to lessen the harshness of the
FAA's infringement into this essential state right, leading to confusion
regarding just how much power states have retained in contract law
relating to arbitration.
The first case, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,"'
confronted the issue left by Prima Paint of whether parties are free to
agree to have state law govern their arbitration agreement."l In holding
that parties are free to contract around the FAA, the Court cited
Bernhardt, which stated that "the FAA does not 'reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration' ..... Congress's primary
purpose was to make parties' arbitration agreements enforceable. "1 3
95. See Kornegay, supra note 1, at 357 (citing Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686); see also
Sternlight, supra note 5, at 667 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1993)).
96. Kornegay, supra note 1, at 357 n.187 (citing Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686).
97. Id. at 357 n.186 (citing Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687).
98. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 667.
99. See Kornegay, supra note 1, at 355.
100. Essentially, without a contract, there can be no arbitration agreement. According
to the AAA, "[t]he arbitrator's authority is created by the contract, subject to applicable
arbitration law. In effect, the parties breathe life into [the] arbitrator." American
Arbitration, A Guide for Commercial Arbitrators, available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp
?JSPssid=15727&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\RulesProcedures\ADRGuides\comguide.html
see also discussion infra Part VI.A.2.
101. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
102. Kornegay, supra note 1, at 353 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. 468).
103. Id. at 353-54 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 (noting that the primary purpose of the
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The greatest gains for a state's right to govern its contract law in the
area of arbitration undoubtedly came in the Court's decision in First
Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan.""' First Options involved an objection
to an arbitration agreement on the grounds that one of the parties had
not signed the agreement.'05
The Court first determined that the question of "who has the
primary power to decide arbitrability" is "fairly simple."'O In what has
been viewed as a contradiction to the Court's previous holding in Prima
PaintY' the Court then concluded that the question of arbitrability
should depend upon whether the parties had agreed to submit that
question itself to arbitration."'8 In deciding this, the Court placed
FAA was to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration)). It could be argued that this defines
the scope that the Court intended in Moses H. Cone when it declared that the FAA created a
federal policy favoring arbitration.
104. 514 U.S. 938 (1995). For an in-depth discussion of First Options and its impact on
"The Arbitrability Question Itself," see Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 308 (1999) (addressing the trouble courts and commentators have
had in applying the framework that First Options provides for determining whether a court or
an arbitrator will decide the question of whether the parties had actually agreed to arbitrate
their disputes).
105. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941. Kaplan was the sole-owner of MK Investments, Inc.
(MKI), which incurred substantial losses after the stock market collapse of October 1987. Id.
at 940. MKI entered into a series of agreements with First Options, the clearinghouse firm to
which it encumbered a substantial amount of debt. Id. Kaplan signed several of those
agreements as the president of MKI, including one that contained an arbitration clause. Id. at
941. Kaplan also signed one agreement in his individual capacity, which did not contain an
arbitration agreement. Id. When a dispute arose, First Options attempted to initiate
arbitration against both MKI and Kaplan individually, which Kaplan resisted. Id.
106. Id. at 943; see also Rau, supra note 104, at 292.
107. It is important to note that the First Options Court does not cite Prima Paint.
Prima Paint will be explored in greater detail infra Part IV, but at this point it is important to
note that Prima Paint involved an allegation of fraud in the inducement of the contract itself
as opposed to an allegation, as seen in First Options, that there had never been an agreement
to arbitrate. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, 388 U.S. 395, 395 (1967).
Whether the Court's holding in Prima Paint, that allegations of fraud on the contract
generally should be decided by an arbitrator, is usurped by First Options has been the subject
of much debate. See, e.g., William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of
Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133, 136-37 (noting the
problematic consequences of the dicta in First Options); Kornegay, supra note 1, at 356
(quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944, and suggesting that the language in First Options is
potentially broad enough to apply to allegations of fraud in the inducement of a contract).
The question of jurisdiction over the arbitration question itself is well beyond the scope of
this Comment. The focus of this Comment is on those situations in which the agreement itself
is not in dispute, rather, the contract in which the agreement contained is claimed to be void,
and therefore, nonexistent.
108. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944; see also AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
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significance on the fact that an agreement to arbitrate "flow[s]
inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract
between the parties."109 As will be shown later, this reliance on an
existing contract between the parties has significant consequences when
a contract can be considered void, and thus nonexistent."'
The Court next determined that "[w]hen deciding whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability),
courts.., should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts."' Consequently, First Options gives states the
right to apply general principles of contract law in situations when one
party resists arbitration by challenging the existence of any agreement,
provided that the agreement itself did not dictate that the arbitrability
question be arbitrated."'
Having reviewed the relevant decisions that have led to the rapid
expansion of the FAA into the realm of state courts and state law, it is
important to take a closer look at Prima Paint to determine how the
Supreme Court's decision would eventually lead lower courts to apply
the FAA to void contracts.
IV. PRIMA PAINT REVISITED
The facts at issue in Prima Paint were relatively simple. Prima Paint
(Prima), a New Jersey corporation, entered into a contract with Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Company (F&C), a Maryland corporation,
wherein F&C agreed to perform consulting services in connection with
the transfer of its operations to Prima.' The contract contained a broad
arbitration clause that stated that "any controversy.., arising out of...
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (holding that parties may agree to arbitrate arbitrability).
109. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
110. See discussion infra Part V.B.
111. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (citing, inter alia, Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.,
489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989)).
112. This holding, it would seem, allows an arbitration agreement to which both parties
had not agreed, to nonetheless allow an arbitrator to determine his own jurisdiction based on
the mere fact that the agreement contained pertinent language. How could a party refuse to
agree to arbitration yet at the same time agree that a dispute regarding whether she did or did
not agree be decided by an arbitrator? The Court addresses this to a certain extent by noting
that "[c]ourts should not assume that parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is
'clear and unmistakable' evidence that they did so." Id. (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). As a result, the power to apply contract
law principles in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists returns a semblance of
power over arbitration law to states that had not clearly existed after Prima Paint.
113. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,397 (1967).
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this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.""'
Prima refused to pay when its first payment under the contract came
due, claiming that F&C failed to disclose the fact that it was insolvent
and planned to file for bankruptcy shortly after the contract was
signed. "5 F&C filed the required notice for arbitration, while Prima
filed a diversity action in federal court to rescind the consulting
agreement and stay the arbitration proceeding based on a claim of
fraudulent inducement of the contract."6 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit "define[d] the FAA as a rule of 'national substantive
law' that 'governs even in the face of contrary state' law" and stayed the
action pending arbitration."' Prima appealed this. decision to the United
States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court easily extinguished the, commerce question.
The Court determined that, because the transaction consisted of a
transfer and selling of operations from a New Jersey corporation to a
Maryland corporation, and because the company to be acquired had
wholesale clients in a number of different states, it was clearly "a
contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce.""' Having
made this determination, the Court turned to "the question [of] whether
the federal court or an arbitrator is to resolve a claim of 'fraud in the
inducement,"'9 under a contract governed by the [FAA]." 2 Here, the
Court had to resolve a circuit split regarding whether the severability
question is an issue to be determined by federal courts or to be
governed by state contract law.
114. Id. at 398.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Kornegay, supra note 1, at 341.
117. Kornegay, supra note 1, at 342 (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 399-400).
118. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 399-400.
119. Fraud in the inducement of a contract renders a contract "voidable." Burden v.
Check Into Cash, 267 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 163 cmt. a (1979); Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1987)). On the other
hand, "[f]raud in the factum or execution, 'that is, the sort of fraud that procures a party's
signature to an instrument without knowledge of its true nature or contents' renders a
contract void." Burden, 267 F.3d at 489 (quoting Langley, 484 U.S. at 93-94).
120. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 396.
121. Id. at 402-03. The Second Circuit had expressed in this case that arbitration clauses
were "separable" from the rest of the contract and that, unless the claim was directed at the
arbitration agreement itself, a federal policy in favor of arbitration dictated that the arbitrator
hear the claim. Id. The First Circuit, on the other hand, had determined that severability was
an issue to be determined by state contract law. Id. (citing Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth
Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 923-24 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960)).
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The Court sided with the Second Circuit's decision that severability
under the FAA is not a proper subject for state contract law.22 In doing
so, the Court cited section 4, which reads, in part: "The court shall hear
the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement."'23 According to the
majority, this dictated that "[flederal courts are bound to apply rules
enacted by Congress with respect to matters-here a contract involving
commerce-over which it has legislative power. ,124 In one fell swoop,
the Court had determined that Congress had intended to use its
commerce powers,12 creating a federal body of substantive law rather
than a mere procedural remedy in a diversity case. Furthermore, the
Court's holding that claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract
were to be decided by a court would eventually be extended to claims
that the contract itself is void.2
V. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE FAA AND VOID
CONTRACTS
A. Issues Raised and Left to be Resolved by Prima Paint
Prima Paint resolved several issues that, as has been shown, would
provide the framework for the subsequent expansion of the FAA. First,
the Court delineated that an arbitration clause is separable from the
other clauses in the contract.'27 Second, the Court's decision that
Congress had relied on its commerce power to create substantive law
governing arbitration opened the door for subsequent expansion of the
FAA into state courts.'28 Finally, the general tone of the Court's opinion
would provide a precedent to later establish the FAA as a national
122. Id. at 404.
123. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added).
124. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406. For Justice Black's response in his dissent to this, see
infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
125. By concluding that Congress had effectuated its commerce power, the Court was
able to side-step the question of whether Congress could legislate federal rules of decision
simply because the parties happen to be diverse. See discussion supra Part II.B; Hirshman,
supra note 20, at 1321.
126. See infra Parts V.B.2. and V.C.
127. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
128. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967);
discussion supra Part III.C.
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policy favoring arbitration.129
Prima Paint did, however, leave one issue for the rest of the judiciary
to resolve. Before going further, it is important to note that the
majority's holding specifically dealt with a party claiming fraud in the
inducement of the contract as a whole when it decided that the FAA
requires that issue to be determined by an arbitrator.'3 ° The Court
further determined that if the claim goes to the making of the
arbitration agreement itself, a court may proceed with adjudication.'
As will be distinguished further below, fraudulent inducement of a
contract renders a contract "voidable" at the option of one of the
parties." This is in contrast to fraud in the factum,'33 which renders a
contract void.'34 The Court failed to make a distinction between "void"
and "voidable," leaving lower courts to determine if this was a
distinction inherent in the Court's analysis.
B. Fraud in the Factum and the Void-Voidable Distinction
1. Fraud in the Factum Distinguished from Fraud in the Inducement
The distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the
inducement carries particular significance in the area of arbitration law.
Fraud in the inducement has been referred to as "fraud in which the
consent to the contract is not at issue but where the consent was
obtained through fraudulent representations. '  Fraud in the factun,
129. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
(determining that the FAA created a national policy favoring arbitration).
130. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406-07.
131. Id. at 403-04.
132. See supra, note 118. The Restatement of Contracts defines a "voidable" contract as
"one where one or more parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so, to
avoid the legal relations created by the contract, or by ratification of the contract to
extinguish the power of avoidance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981).
133. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
134. A void contract is essentially not a contract at all. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a (1981) ("A promise for breach of which the law neither gives a
remedy nor otherwise recognizes a duty of performance ... is often called a void contract.
However, such a promise is not a contract at all."). Fraud in the inducement includes, inter
alia, common law contract defenses such as fraud, mistake, or duress. Three Valleys Mun.
Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. b (1981)).
135. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1399
(1991).
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on the other hand, "makes the consent to the contract ineffective."13 6
One court recently outlined a succinct description of the distinction:
Fraud in the factum occurs when a party makes a
misrepresentation that "is regarded as going to the very
character of the proposed contract itself, as when one party
[causes] the other to sign a document by falsely stating that it has
no legal effect." If the misrepresentation is of this type, then
"there is no contract at all, or what is sometimes anomalously
described as a void, as opposed to voidable, contract." If the
fraud relates to the inducement to enter the contract, then the
agreement is "voidable" at the option of the innocent party. The
distinction is that if there is fraud in the inducement, the contract
is enforceable against at least one party, while fraud in the
factum means that at no time was there a contractual obligation
between the parties. 37
The importance of distinguishing whether the object of the fraud was
the very character of the proposed contract is an important distinction in
arbitration law because where "there is ... no contract at all," '38 it
follows that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction.139
2. Fraud in the Factum Applied
The Ninth Circuit provides an insightful analysis into the Prima
Paint dilemma in an attempt to distinguish fraud in the inducement from
fraud in the factum in Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1400 (citing Dougherty v. Mieczkowski, 661 F. Supp. 267, 274 (D. Del. 1987)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) (respectively quoting E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §
4.10, at 235 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 cmt. a, § 164 (1981)).
The Restatement provides that fraud in the factum occurs when:
[B]ecause of misrepresentation as to the character or essential terms of a proposed
contract, a party does not know or have reasonable opportunity to know of its
character or essential terms, then he neither knows nor has reason to know that the
other party may infer from his conduct that he assents to that contract. In such a
case there is no effective manifestation of assent and no contract at all.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 cmt. a. (1981) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at § 7 cmt. a.
139. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (noting that
'arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties").
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Hutton & Co. 4' Three Valleys Municipal Water District (Three
Valleys) filed suit against E.F. Hutton & Company (Hutton) for losing
over $8 million in their investment accounts.14 1 In turn, Hutton,
pursuant to the agreement between the parties and under the ambit of
sections 3 and 4, filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the
federal proceeding.14'2 The district court compelled arbitration of the
state law claims, but denied arbitration on the federal securities law
claims. 43 Hutton contended that the client agreements that contained
the arbitration clauses were void because they were signed by a person
without authority to sign for the company.'" The Ninth Circuit
determined that the issue of whether the contract was void should be
decided by a court, rather than an arbitrator.
145
The court engaged in a narrow interpretation of Prima Paint,
reading the Supreme Court's decision as "limited to challenges seeking
to avoid or rescind a contract-not to challenges going to the very
existence of a contract."1'6 The court went on to state that "[u]nder this
view, Prima Paint applies to 'voidable' contracts-those 'where one
party was an infant, or where the contract was induced by fraud, 471
mistake, or duress, or where breach of a warranty or other promise
justifies the aggrieved party in putting an end to the contract.'"148 The
court further stated that "a party who contests the making of a contract
containing an arbitration provision cannot be compelled to arbitrate the
threshold issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate; only a court
can make that decision. "1
49
While the Ninth Circuit in Three Valleys read Prima Paint narrowly,
the Fifth Circuit in Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Services5" read
that decision broadly. In that case, the Lawrences alleged that the
franchise agreement in which they had entered was illegal under Texas
140. 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991).
141. Id. at 1137.
142. Id. at 1138.
143. Id.
144. Id. A classic example of fraud in the factum.
145. Id. at 1140-41.
146. Id. at 1140 (emphasis added).
147. The issue found in Prima Paint itself.
148. Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 7 cmt. b (1981)).
149. Id.
150. 833 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987).
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law and that such illegality was not a proper subject for an arbitrator."'
The court, emphasizing the "strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration" as articulated in Moses H. Cone,' extended the reach of the
FAA to contracts that are "void from... inception."'53  The vast
contrast between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit's approaches in applying
Prima Paint illustrates the necessity for the Supreme Court to clearly
articulate that it had no intention that the FAA ever apply to
nonexistent contracts by granting certiorari to a case that applies the
FAA to a void contract. 5
4
C. Contracts that are Void as a Matter of State Law
As illustrated by Lawrence, the second way a contract can be
rendered void, in addition to fraud in the factum, is via a state's power
to determine that certain contracts will be void as a matter of state
law."5 Burden v. Check Into Cash,'56 the most recent circuit court case to
attempt to interpret the scope of Prima Paint, addressed such an issue.
The Sixth Circuit's analysis and convoluted reasoning provide an
excellent example of the difficulty lower courts have had in applying
Prima Paint to allegations that a contract is void.
The facts of the case are straightforward. Beverly Burden was the
trustee for four bankrupt estates in Lexington, Kentucky, while the
defendant, Check Into Cash is incorporated and does business in
Kentucky.' The issue in the case arose from transactions that were
essentially "payday loans."'58  These loans were characterized by
151. Id. at 1160.
152. Id. at 1164 (citing Moses H. Cone Meml. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983)).
153. Id. at 1162.
154. The Court recently declined to do so in Burden v. Check Into Cash, 267 F.3d 483
(6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1436 (2002), perhaps because it is waiting for the
circuits to become even further divided on this subject.
155. As will be seen in Burden, states are typically inclined to make certain contracts
void to protect its citizens from unscrupulous business practices. See infra note 164. This is a
power granted to the states in the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S.
Const. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
156. 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1436 (2002).
157. Burden, 267 F.3d at 486.
158. Id. For a discussion of the case, see Justin Kelly, Court Asked to Review Validity of
Arbitration Clause in Void Contract, ADR NEWS (January 4, 2002), at
http://www.adrworld.com/opendocument.asp?doc+q2m3fjode. For a discussion of the
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exorbitant interest rates and short-term borrowing periods, during
which customers would pay approximately $19 for every $100
borrowed. 59 In 1997, Check Into Cash added an arbitration clause to
the back of the customer agreements, which the plaintiffs in this case
signed.6 Despite this arbitration clause, Burden filed suit in the district
court alleging, inter alia, violations of several Kentucky consumer
protection statutes. 6'
In a separate case in 1999, the Kentucky Supreme Court answered a
certified question, determining that when a check-cashing company
accepts a check and defers deposit pursuant to an agreement with the
maker of the check, the fee that is charged is "interest," rather than a
service fee.162 Accordingly, Check Into Cash was not exempted from the
Kentucky statute licensing check-cashing businesses and was instead
required to be licensed as a lender. 63 Because, Check Into Cash was an
unlicensed lender, under Kentucky law any loan contract in which it
entered was void.'" In January of 2000, Check Into Cash filed a motion
in the district court under the FAA to compel arbitration and stay
litigation pending the arbitration. 65  The district court denied this
motion and the case was heard by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.16
In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit seemed to rely heavily on the maxim:
"As a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
"payday loan" industry, see infra Part V.B.1.
159. Burden, 267 F.3d at 486. This results in an annual percentage rate ranging
anywhere from 500% to 900%. Id.
160. Burden, 267 F.3d at 487. The record indicates that the plaintiffs entered into
transactions prior to, as well as after, the mandatory arbitration clause was added. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(2) (Michie 1998)).
164. Id. The relevant Kentucky Statute provided that:
Any person who shall engage in the business regulated by this chapter without first
securing a license therefore shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor
more than five thousand dollars ($5,000). Any loan contract made in violation of this
chapter shall be void and the lender shall have no right to collect any principal,
charges or recompense whatsoever.
Id. § 288.991 (emphasis added).
165. Burden, 267 F.3d at 486.
166. Id. Beyond contending that these contracts should be considered void, plaintiffs
also contended that prior to December of 1997, the loan agreements did not contain an
arbitration clause and that they were never informed that such a clause was added. Id. at 487.
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arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."' 67 First, the
court noted that, under Prima Paint, "arbitration clauses were
'separable' from the contracts in which they were included."' 68 Because
of this, a claim of fraud in the inducement had to be aimed at the
arbitration agreement itself, rather than the contract as a whole.'69 The
court then noted the trend in other circuits to make a distinction
between "void" and "voidable" contracts.7
Despite its previous ruling to the contrary in C.B.S. Employees
Federal Credit Union v. Donaldson,' in which the court had declined to
follow the lead of fellow circuits in distinguishing between void and
voidable contracts, the court accepted the void/voidable distinction
because an arbitration agreement "cannot arise out of a broader
contract if no broader contract ever existed."'72 According to the court,
however, the line of cases that created this distinction was inapplicable
because those cases dealt with "signatory power, not contract
content." ' The court cited to an example given in Three Valleys as
evidence of this distinction:
"Party A could forge party B's name to a contract and compel
party B to arbitrate the question of the genuineness of its
signature. Similarly, any citizen of Los Angeles could sign a
167. Id. at 488 (citing Wilson Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878
F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983))).
168. Id. (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp. 388 U.S. 395, 402
(1967)).
169. Id. (citing C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Sec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1563, 1567 (6th Cir. 1990)).
170. Id. (citing Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2000));
Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991).
As illustrated, on the opposite end of the spectrum, the Fifth Circuit, in Lawrence v.
Comprehensive Business Services Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987), ruled that Prima
Paint applies even to contracts that are "void from ... inception." Id.
171. 912 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1990). Although the court declined to accept the distinction
between void and voidable, the court in C.B.S. Employees, relying on Prima Paint,
nonetheless allowed the allegation of fraud to be decided by the court because the allegation
was directed at the arbitration agreement itself. See generally id.
172. Burden, 267 F.3d at 483 (quoting Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 108).
173. Id. at 489. The court cites to the following cases in other circuits that determined
that a claim that a contract was void from its inception based on a lack of signatory power
should be decided by a court, rather than an arbitrator: Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. All
American Insurance Co., 256 F.3d 587, 390-91 (7th Cir. 2001); Sandvik, 220 F.3d 99; Chastain
v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1992); Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at
1140; I.S. Joseph Co. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396,400 (8th Cir. 1986).
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contract on behalf of the city and Los Angeles would be required
to submit to an arbitrator the question whether it was bound to
the contract, even if its charter prevented it from engaging in any
arbitration."'74
The court only provided a cursory explanation as to why Burden's
argument that Check Into Cash was unlicensed and therefore did not
have authority to enter into the loan agreements did not constitute an
argument based on signatory power.17 The court reasoned that in Three
Valleys, the party resisting arbitration did not possess signatory power,
whereas here, the party attempting to compel arbitration did not possess
signatory power.17  Consequently, the court, without further
explanation, concluded that Three Valleys was "of no moment." , 7 This
holding is in direct conflict with, inter alia, the Eighth Circuit, which had
previously stated that "[c]ase law supports our holding that the
enforceability of an arbitration clause is a question for the court when
one party denies the existence of a contract with the other." '
The Burden court elaborated that the Three Valleys line of cases
requires more than an allegation that the contract violated a statutory
provision, but must concern a "misrepresentation as to the character or
essential terms of a proposed contract."'7 Because the case at bar dealt
with substantive law-a violation of Kentucky's usury interest laws-the
court concluded that the district court incorrectly relied on Three
Valleys.' 0 Rather, it should have relied on the Sixth Circuit's precedent
from C.B.S. Employees, which indicated that the "central issue" to
consider is whether the alleged fraud dealt with the arbitration
agreement itself, rather than the contract as a whole. 8'
The Sixth Circuit's analysis speaks volumes about the confusion that
has developed in this area of arbitration law. The following rules can be
gleaned from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Burden: (1) consistent with
174. Burden, 267 F.3d at 490 (quoting Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140).
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. I.S. Joseph Co., 803 F.2d at 400 (emphasis added) (citing American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)).
179. Burden, 267 F.3d at 490 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163
cmt. a (1979)).
180. Id. at 490.
181. Id. at 489.
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Prima Paint, a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract as a
whole should be decided by an arbitrator; (2) a claim of fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself should be decided by the
court; (3) an action challenging the signatory power of the party that is
resisting the arbitration should be decided by a court; (4) a challenge
based on the signatory power of the party seeking to compel the
arbitration clause, even though that party may have never had authority
to enter into any contract at all, rendering the contract void, should,
nonetheless, be decided by an arbitrator; and (5) an action challenging
the substance of the contract, including whether the contract is void
under state law, should be decided by an arbitrator.
Beyond its nearly impossible application, several disturbing
consequences arise from this set of rules. First, a party that had no
power or authority to enter into a contract to begin with, either under
principals of agency law82 or because they were unlicensed, 3 would
nonetheless have the power to compel the arbitration of their
transgressions, the very "bootstrapping" that the Ninth Circuit in Three
Valleys was seeking to avoid.8 ' Second, a party retains the power to
compel arbitration even when a contract is void-or when there is no
contract at all-which is in direct conflict with the idea that an
"arbitrator's jurisdiction is rooted in the agreement of the parties. "85
Because Prima Paint dealt only with an issue of fraudulent
inducement of the contract, its authority over the Sixth Circuit in
Burden is limited. On the other hand, Justice Black, in his Prima Paint
dissent, seemingly spoke to a situation not all that dissimilar from the
situation in Burden. Justice Black would undoubtedly disagree with the
distinction made by the Sixth Circuit in Burden.'86 According to Black,
182. Id. at 489-90 (citing Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d at 590-91
(determining whether the signatory had power to bind company); Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l
Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 110 (3d Cir. 2000) (determining whether the signatory had power to bind
company); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th
Cir. 1991) (determining whether a signatory had power to bind principals); LS. Joseph, 803
F.2d at 400 (determining whether assignee of signatory had power to enforce arbitration
agreement)). Under the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, all of these cases would have been decided
differently had the party compelling arbitration lacked signatory power, despite the fact that
none of these cases indicated that the holding was limited to the signatory power of the party
resisting arbitration.
183. See generally Burden, 267 F.3d 483.
184. Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1145 (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1140 (quoting George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local
354, 722 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984) and IS. Joseph, 803 F.2d at 399 (8th Cir. 1986)).
186. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,407-25 (1967) (Black,
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sections 2 and 3 of the FAA dictate that "an arbitration agreement is to
be enforced by a federal court unless the court, not the arbitrator, finds
grounds 'at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'"'""
While the issue in Prima Paint centered around fraudulent inducement
of the contract, Black went on to state that the FAA merely provides for
enforcement where there is a valid contract.8  Black would
unquestionably agree that a claim that a contract is void because it
violates state law or a claim of fraud in the factum is an issue for the
court. Such an issue is quite obviously a ground "at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. "'89
Although the Ninth Circuit decided an issue of signatory power, the
language in Three Valleys provides a strong indication that the court
intended its holding to apply to any contract that is void, and therefore
nonexistent. The court's analysis provides no indication that the fraud
in the factum claim rests only in a challenge of signatory power.
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit's haphazard analysis in Burden provides a
clear indication that the circuit courts have clearly taken divergent paths
in interpreting Prima Paint. By granting certiorari to a case that extends
the reach of the FAA to a void contract, the Supreme Court would be
able to address this divergence and delineate the FAA's inapplicability
to void contracts.
D. State Regulation of Payday Loans
1. State Attempts to Regulate the Payday Loan Industry
The payday loan industry has increased exponentially over the last
several years.'9 A recent study' by the Wisconsin Department of
Financial Institutions highlights the problem presented by these loans.'
The transaction is simple: in return for cash, a borrower signs a loan
agreement and provides the lender with a post-dated check or other
J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 412 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2) (Black, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
189. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1984).
190. In 2001 the State of Wisconsin licensed forty payday lenders, as compared to two in
1996. State of Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions, Review of Payday Lending in
Wisconsin 2001, at 4, available at http://www.wdfi.orglresources/indexed/ site/newsroom/
press/payday-loan.may 2001 .pdf.
191. Id. at 2.
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checking information.192 When the loan comes due, the borrower has a
choice of rolling the loan over and incurring additional interest charges
or paying in full.'93 The average annual percentage rate (APR) on these
loans in Wisconsin in 2001 was a startling 542.20%.' In Wisconsin in
1999, there were 839,285 payday loans issued.9 On average, 53% were
rolled-over because the borrower was unable to pay after the initial
term."6
The obvious potential for abuse in this industry leaves states with the
task of protecting the public from unknowingly losing thousands of
dollars. As evidenced in Burden, many states have provided that the
fees charged by these companies are considered interest rather than
service fees. 97 Accordingly, these lenders need to be licensed by the
state.9 Many state legislatures have dictated that contracts entered into
by lenders charging interest rates without a license will be considered
void, and the lender will have no right to collect.'99
2. State Court Cases Addressing Arbitration Clauses in Contracts that
are Deemed Void as Violating Payday Loan Statutes
In two recent cases, state supreme courts have addressed the role of
arbitration clauses in contracts that are alleged to be void for violating
payday loan statutes. First, the Alabama Supreme Court, in Alabama
Catalog Sales v. Harris,2" determined that "a party who contests the
making of a contract containing an arbitration provision cannot be
compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate' . . . 'only a court can make that decision.'"2"' In
192. Id. at 1.
193. Id. at 6.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id. at 7 (citing statistics from a review of 450 borrowers in 2000).
197. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
199. For example, the Alabama Small Loan Act, after addressing the illegality of
collecting on loans without a license, provides that "[a]ny contract of loan in the making or
collection of which any act shall have been done which violates this section shall be void, and
the lender shall have no right to collect, receive or retain any principal, interest or charges
whatsoever." ALA. CODE. 1975, § 5-18-4(d) (1975) (emphasis added).
200. 794 So. 2d 312 (Ala. 2000).
201. Id. at 317 (emphasis added) (citing NationsBanc Invs., Inc. v. Paramore, 736 So. 2d
589, 593 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc. v. Crisp, 646 So. 2d 613, 616-17
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rejecting the defendant's reliance on Prima Paint, the court insightfully
noted that "Prima Paint is inapplicable to challenges going to the very
existence of a contract." 2 '
The Alabama Supreme Court was obviously concerned about
protecting its power to protect consumers from the payday loan
industry. The court cited to a Supreme Court case, Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 3 for the proposition "that a state retains the
power to regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general
contract law principles, and may invalidate an arbitration clause upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 2°4 The court also cited extensively to Three Valleys25 without
distinguishing, as the Sixth Circuit did, a line of demarcation between
nonexistence of a contract due to signatory power and nonexistence due
to a violation of a state law.2l
In Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton,?7 a Florida court of appeals took
an even stronger stance against the arbitration of claims that a contract
is void.2 ' As with Burden and Harris, the issue in Party Yards centered
around an allegation that a loan contract between businesses was void
because it violated Florida's usury laws. 9 According to the court, "[a]s
a matter of law, a usury violation does not arise under an agreement...
[it] arises under state statutory law."21 Noting that the claim went to
whether the contract was illegal, and consequently, criminal, the court
forcefully stated that "[a]n arbitrator cannot order a party to perform an
(Ala. 1994))).
202. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
203. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
204. Harris, 794 So. 2d at 316 (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1984)).
205. The court quoted its earlier opinion in Shearson: "Although Prima Paint has
ostensibly been construed to require the arbitration of any claim 'unless there has been an
independent challenge to the making of the arbitration clause itself,' it appears that the
majority of courts have, on better reasoning, read Prima Paint more narrowly." Harris, 794
So. 2d at 314 n.2 (quoting Shearson Lehman Bros., 646 So. 2d at 616 (citations omitted)).
206. Id. at 316.
207. 751 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
208. Id.; see also Fastfunding The Company, Inc. v. Betts, 758 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding in a payday loan case that the court, rather than an arbitrator,
determines an allegation that a contract is void when it violated state usury laws).
209. Party Yards, 751 So. 2d at 123.
210. Id.; see also Burden v. Check Into Cash, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001); Plaintiff's
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, available at http://www.tlpj.org/briefs/burdenbriefl-7-02.pdf
(using Party Yards to argue for certiorari to the Supreme Court).
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illegal act."2" The Florida Supreme Court further noted that courts
themselves should not lend assistance to carrying out illegal contracts.212
By applying the enforcement provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the
FAA to contracts that state legislatures determine are void as violating
payday loan laws, courts are undermining the ability of states to protect
consumers. Allowing an unlicensed institution that engages in illegal
lending practices to have its choice of jurisdiction by virtue of a void and
nonexistent contract essentially renders a legislative effort to protect
consumers void, and thus nonexistent.
VI. THE FAA SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED WHEN NO AGREEMENT
EXISTS
A. Ramifications of Extending the FAA to Void Contracts
The expansion of the FAA has led to a great deal of confusion. This
confusion has recently led to its application to void contracts that
essentially never existed.2"3  Such an application carries absurd
consequences.21' The Supreme Court needs to address this situation and
seize the opportunity to provide clarification to at least one area of law
under the FAA.
1. Applying the FAA to Void Contracts Impermissibly Places
Arbitration Clauses on a Higher Footing than Other Contract
Provisions.
Several Supreme Court Cases have indicated that the primary
purpose of the FAA was to replace the judicial hostility for
arbitration. 5 In EEOC v. Waffle House Inc. ,216 the most recent case to
address the scope of arbitration under the FAA, the Supreme Court
relied heavily on the idea that "[t]he FAA directs courts to place
211. Party Yards, 751 So. 2d at 123 (citing Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192,
1195 (7th Cir. 1987)).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Burden v. Check Into Cash, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct 1436 (2002); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Sys., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987).
214. See notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
216. No. 99-1823, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 489 (Jan. 15, 2002) (determining that the EEOC
retains the power to enforce statutory claims despite an employee's agreement to arbitrate
claims against his employer).
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arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts." '217
According to the Court, the FAA was enacted to "'reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed
at English common law and had been adopted by American courts."'218
This "equal footing" has provided the basis for the Court's
usurpation of state laws in expanding the scope of the FAA. In Doctor's
Associates,219 for example, the Court found that the FAA preempted a
state statute that imposed disclosure requirements for arbitration
agreements because the requirements put the arbitration clause on a
lesser footing than the other clauses in the contract.220 According to the
Court in a previous decision:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses,
under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an
arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.' What states may not do is
decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all of its basic
terms... but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.
The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of
policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal 'footing,'
directly contrary to the [FAA's] language and Congress' intent.
2
Applying the FAA to a contract that never existed clearly runs
contrary to the idea that the arbitration clause should be placed on
equal footing as other provisions in a contract. By singling out the
arbitration provision from the rest of the contract and allowing it to
stand before there is a determination of whether a contract even exists,
courts are placing arbitration agreements on a higher level than the
other provisions in the contract and even the contract itself. Just as the
217. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added). According to the legislative history, the
FAA was enacted to place arbitration clauses "upon the same footing as other contracts,
where [they] belong[]." Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 96, 1 (1924)).
218. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
24 (1991)).
219. 517 U.S. 681 (1996); see supra Part III.C.
220. Id.; see also Burden v. Check Into Cash, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001); Plaintiff's
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, available at http://www.tlpj.org/briefs/burdenbriefl-7-02.pdf
(arguing for certiorari to the Supreme Court because the Sixth Circuit's holding in Burden
conflicts with prior interpretations that the FAA should be placed on equal, rather than
higher footing than the other clauses in a contract).
221. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (citations omitted).
2002]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts state laws that give the
arbitration agreement a "suspect status, ' so too should the Court hold
that decisions that give the arbitration agreement a "special status" are
inconsistent with the intent of the FAA. It is inconceivable to believe
that a court would allow any other provision in a contract to stand
before determining whether, in fact, there actually was a contract.
2. Applying the FAA to Void Contracts Impermissibly Impinges on
State's Rights to Govern Contract Law.
Prior to Prima Paint, the Supreme Court indicated an intention to
prevent the expansion of the FAA into the realm of state substantive
law. 23 Dissenting in Prima Paint, Justice Black rightfully forecasted the
potential of that case to usurp states' traditional rights to govern
contract law.2 " According to Black, the majority's decision that section
4225 provided an "explicit answer" .to the question of severability "took a
procedural remedy and fashioned it into a substantive law that could
and did interfere with state substantive law to the contrary., 2 6 Justice
Black further stated that section 4 did not provide an "explicit answer,"
but rather posed the further question of "what kind of allegations put
the making of the arbitration agreement in issue. ,27
This judicial expansion of the FAA has had extreme consequences
on states' ability to govern contract law. It is important to remember
that arbitration law is only a form of contract law.22' Because of this, the
FAA is not a complete code of arbitration law. State contract law
principles must also come into play. Section 2 provides that
222. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
223. See discussion supra Part IIIB; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350
U.S. 198 (1956) (interpreting the FAA narrowly to avoid impinging on states' rights to
regulate substantive law); Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932) (insinuating
that the FAA was intended to be applied exclusively in federal courts).
224. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,407-25 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting).
225. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) ("[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.") (emphasis added).
226. Kornegay, supra note 1, at 344 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411 (Black, J.,
dissenting)) (footnotes omitted).
227. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 410 (Black, J., dissenting).
228. See Kornegay, supra note 1, at 359.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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arbitration clauses "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. '231 To determine the "grounds [that] ... exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract," courts necessarily need to
turn to state contract laws.32
A close examination of the language of section 2 dictates that courts
should defer to the states' right to determine when a contract is or is not
void. This includes both situations where state common law principles
render a contract void 3 and where a violation of a state statute dictates
that the contract is void.3 .
As shown above, the payday loan inldustry is one area of the law in
which it is necessary for states to exercise their power to govern contract
law.235 Any business that is extending loans at an annual interest rate of
over 500% should be closely regulated by a state.236 States have done
this by requiring payday loan companies to be licensed as lenders.2 7 It
does not stand to reason, then, that unlicensed lenders can have their
choice of jurisdiction honored merely because an arbitration clause was
included in a nonexistent contract. Decisions in the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits, however, allow for such absurd results.23s
3. Where a Contract is Void, an Arbitrator Has no Jurisdiction
Several authorities stand for the proposition that an arbitrator's
jurisdiction is grounded in the agreement between the parties.239
According to the Supreme Court in First Options, arbitration "flow[s]
inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract
between the parties.""24  The American Arbitration Association, for
example, expressly states that "[t]he arbitrator's authority is created by
231. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
232. See Kornegay, supra note 1, at 359 (noting that "[t]he FAA depends upon general
law of contracts to provide its 'infrastructure ").
233. Typically, a contract will be deemed void when there is "a misrepresentation as to
the character or essential terms of a proposed contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 163 cmt. a (1981).
234. See supra Part V.C.
235. See supra, Part V.D.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Burden v. Check Into Cash, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
1436 (2002); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987).
239. See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
240. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
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the contract, ... [i]n effect, the parties breathe life into [the]
arbitrator."24"' Likewise, Justice Black, in his Prima Paint dissent, noted
that when a contract is procured by fraud,242 there is no contract and
nothing can be arbitrated because sections 2 and 3 assume a valid
contract.243  These sections provide for the enforcement of the
agreement only when a valid contract exists.2" Further, according to the
Ninth Circuit in Three Valleys, "because an 'arbitrator's jurisdiction is
rooted in the agreement of the parties,' a party who contests the making
of a contract containing an arbitration provision cannot be compelled to
arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate. Only 'a court can make that decision." '245 Finally, the Eighth
Circuit has noted that an arbitrator "has no independent source of
jurisdiction apart from the consent of the parties."2 6
The expansion of the FAA has had dramatic consequences on the
law of arbitration in the United States. Applying the enforcement
provisions of the FAA to agreements that do not exist would be the
most absurd and dramatic consequence to date. The aforementioned
authorities demonstrate that an arbitrator's authority rests solely on a
241. American Arbitration Association: A guide for Commercial Arbitrators, available at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JsPssid=15727&JSPsrc=upload/LIVESITE/RulesProcedure
s/ADR-Guides/comguide.html.
242. Justice Black makes no distinction between fraud in the inducement and fraud in
the factum. He extends the argument that this Comment is making, suggesting that any claim
of fraud regarding the contract should be decided by a court before arbitration is compelled.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 412 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting). While theoretically correct, given the recent proliferation of arbitration
contracts, this would lead to a tidal wave of parties claiming fraudulent inducement in an
effort to avoid arbitration.
243. Id. at 413. To support this assertion, Justice Black turned to the legislative history
surrounding the Act, noting that one senator, in hearings on the bill, observed that "[tihe
court has got to hear and determine whether there is an agreement of arbitration,
undoubtedly, and it is open to all defenses, equitable and legal, that would have existed at
law .. " Id.
244. Id. at 412-13.
245. Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.
1991) (quoting George Day'Constr. Co.v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 354, 722 F.2d
1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984)). The court went on to state that applying Prima Paint to an
allegation going to the existence of a contract would require it to take Prima Paint "one step
further" to a situation that the "majority did not address." Id. at 1141 n.4.
246. I.S. Joseph Co. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1986); see also
Three Valleys, 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Smith Wilson Co. v. Trading &
Dev. Establishment, 744 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1990) ("arbitrators derive their authority to
resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to
arbitration")).
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valid agreement. When a contract is void, whether as a matter of state
statutory or general common law, it never existed, 47 thus an arbitrator
has no jurisdiction to hear the claim. Compelling arbitration for a claim
of void contract would impermissibly provide an arbitrator with
jurisdiction.
B. The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari to a Case that Extends
the FAA to a Void Contract to Provide Clarity to its Prima Paint Holding
The solution to the confusion and contradiction in the circuit courts'
application of the FAA to void ab initio contracts is simple: the Supreme
Court needs to grant certiorari to a case that compels arbitration of an
allegation that a contract is void. Only by hearing such a case and
holding that its Prima Paint decision was strictly limited to situations
where a party claimed fraudulent inducement of a contract, thus
rendering the contract "voidable," rather than "void," will the Court be
able to add some clarity to its "confus[ing] and contradictory holdings
that have followed its FAA rulings of the last forty years. 248
VII. CONCLUSION
Arbitration has become a common judicial forum in the twenty-first
century.249 The unprecedented proliferation of arbitration in the United
States is due, in large part, to the Supreme Court's expansion of the
FAA."' What began as a response to judicial hostility to arbitration"
has now infiltrated state courts. The contradictory and confusing
holdings that have resulted from this rapid expansion have left
"[d]iligent academics... delighted that the raw material essential to the
exercise of their craft is being continually replenished."2 2 Recent circuit
courts that have applied the FAA to allegations that a contract is void
ab initio present academics with more raw material with which to hone
247. See supra note 134.
248. Kornegay, supra note 1, at 358. The Supreme Court has once again been asked to
clarify the confusion in this area in yet another case dealing with usurious interest rates being
charged by a payday loan company that are allegedly violative of state law. See Snowden v.
Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.C.W.
3191 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2002) (No. 02-424). Although the Court recently declined to hear
Burden, a very similar case, the fact that consumers are seeking clarification on this issue once
again is evidence of the desperate need for the Supreme Court's voice on this issue.
249. See supra note 4.
250. See supra Part III.C.; IV.
251. See supra Part II.A; III.B.
252. Rau, supra note 13, at 287.
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their craft.
Prior to 1967, such an absurd application of the FAA seemed
entirely unlikely. Prima Paint, in delineating that claims of fraud in the
inducement of the contract should be compelled to arbitration under the
FAA, opened the door for subsequent confusion."3 The Prima Paint
rule is sensible, considering the multitude of fraud claims that a court
would have to decide from parties trying to avoid an arbitration clause.
Subsequent circuit court interpretations of this rule, however, have been
far from sensible.
Applying the enforcement provisions of the FAA to void contracts
leads to results that seemed unimaginable prior to the Court's holding in
Prima Paint. As shown above, applying the FAA to a contract that is,
or could be determined to be, void, and thus nonexistent, serves to
extend the scope of the FAA well beyond the intentions of either
Congress or the Prima Paint Court. Enforcing arbitration in a void
contract impermissibly places arbitration clauses on a higher footing
than other contract provisions, infringes on states' rights to govern the
substantive area of contract law and to protect consumers, and gives
legal authority to an arbitrator whose only jurisdiction lies in an
agreement that does not exist. It is time for the Supreme Court to end
the confusion over its holding in Prima Paint.
JOSHUA R. WELSH*
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